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NOTES
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AND THIRD PARTY
SUITS: THE AFTERMATH OF WITT v. JACKSON
In Witt v. Jackson,1 the California Supreme Court established two
principles in the field of workmen's compensation as it relates to third
party actions. It was held that a negligent employer could not take
advantage of his own wrong through the recoupment provisions of the
Workmen's Compensation Act, and further, that the injured employee
could not receive a double recovery for the same injuries.
The difficulties inherent in applying simultaneously what may be
mutually exclusive principles are illustrated by cases subsequent to
Witt in which the courts have been forced to apply one principle at the
expense of the other.2 This Note will examine the numerous solutions
that have been presented by the courts, and will propose some possible
alternatives. First, however, a brief diversion into the history and struc-
ture of the workmen's compensation acts is necessary to understand
the context of the Witt decision and the circumstances that make the
concurrent enforcement of both principles of Witt difficult, if not some-
times impossible.
The Background to Witt v. Jackson
Origins of the Workmen's Compensation Acts
Under the early English common law, no distinction was made be-
tween an employer's liability to his injured servant and his liability to
a third person.- The employer's common law liability to his servant
was restricted by the defenses of contributory negligence, assumption
of risk, and the fellow-servant rule.4 The employer was merely obli-
gated to provide the employee with a safe place to work and safe
equipment and tools, warn of dangers inherent in the employment, hire
able coemployees, and make reasonable rules for the exercise of the
1. 57 Cal. 2d 57,73, 366 P.2d 641, 650, 17 Cal. Rptr. 369, 378 (1962).
2. See cases cited notes infra.
3. 2 W. HANNA, CALIFORNIA LAW Op EMPLOYEE INJURIES AND WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION § 1.02 (2d ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as HANNA].
4. The fellow servant rule provided that the employer was not liable for injuries
caused by the negligence of a coworker. For a discussion of -the common law de-
fenses see id. § 1.02[4](a)-(f); W. PROSSER, HANDBooK oF THE LAw Op TORTS 549-54
(3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
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business.5 Beyond these specific requirements, the employee assumed
the burden of industrial injuries, even though he was often in no fi-
nancial position to do so.
In the early decades of the 20th century, American jurisdictions
began to provide systems of workmen's compensation6 based upon a
theory of the employer's strict but limited liability for injuries incident
to the employment.7 Liability imposed under such a system was neither
in tort nor in contract, but was considered incident to the relation of
employer-employee. 8
The objectives of the workmen's compensation acts were also dif-
ferent from the purpose of recovery in a common law personal injury
action. The compensation statutes were designed to provide the injured
employee and his dependents with an adequate means of subsistence
while the employee was recuperating from his injury; this, in turn,
helped bring about speedy recovery which permitted the employee to
return to productive employment within a relatively short period.9
Whereas the common law provided an employee remuneration for the
negligence of the employer, the workmen's compensation statutes merely
furnished the employee with economic insurance for risks which he
undertook incident to his employment. 10
While the constitutionality of the workmen's compensation acts has
often been questioned, their validity has been consistently upheld on
the ground that the industry should assume liability for industrial in-
juries as a part of the cost of production."
5. PROSSER 545-49.
6. Id. at 554; 2 HANNA § 1.03[2](a),(c).
7. PROSSER 555.
8. Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 184 Cal. 26, 36, 192 P.
1021, 1025 (1920); Solari v. Atlas-Universal Serv., Inc., 215 Cal. App. 2d 587, 600,
30 Cal. Rptr. 407, 414 (1963); 2 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW 1652
(7th ed. 1960).
9. Solari v. Atlas-Universal Serv., Inc., 215 Cal. App. 2d 587, 600, 30 Cal.
Rptr. 407, 414 (1963). In West v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 79 Cal. App. 2d
711, 180 P.2d 972 (1947) the court said: "[Tihe purpose of the award is not to
make the employee whole for the loss which he has suffered but to prevent him and
his dependents from becoming public charges during the period of his disability. In
short the award transfers a portion of the loss suffered by the disabled employee from
him and his dependents to the consuming public. Complete protection is not afforded
the employee from disability because this would constitute an invitation to malinger or
to be careless on the job as he would then lose nothing in assuming a disabled status."
Id. at 721, 180 P.2d at 978 (citations omitted).
10. Jacobsen v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 212 Cal. 440, 447, 299 P. 66, 68-69
(1931); see West v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 79 Cal. App. 2d 711, 721-26, 180 P.2d
972, 978-82 (1947). See also CAL. CONST. art. 20, § 21, wherein it is stated:
"[The purpose of a system of workmen's compensation is to] accomplish substantial
justice in all cases expeditiously, inexpensively, and without encumbrance of any
character .... ." See CAL. LABOR CODE § 3201.
11. Western Indem. Co. v. Pillsbury, 170 Cal. 686, 694, 151 P. 398, 407
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Rights of the Employer and Employee under
California's Workmen's Compensation Act
The employee, who is required to take certain risks inherent in his
employment, is assured of economic assistance through workmen's com-
pensation benefits should he suffer an industrial injury. Under section
3601 of the California Labor Code, the right of the employee to work-
men's compensation benefits paid by the employer is an exclusive rem-
edy. 2 To receive an award, the employee need merely show that the
injury arose out of and in the course of his employment; he is not re-
quired to show fault on the part of his employer. 3 This award, how-
ever, in no way abrogates the employee's common law right to sue a
third party who has caused his injury.14  California courts have gone
so far as to hold that the receipt of workmen's compensation benefits is
extraneous to the issue in a third party suit and cannot properly be
considered. 5
The employer, under the Workmen's Compensation Act, is re-
quired to insure, in one way or another, against liability for workmen's
compensation.' Whether or not the employer is at fault, he is obli-
gated to pay benefits as provided by statute. Imposition of such lia-
bility is in lieu of common law liability to the employee47 and thus
shields the employer from any legal action his employee might subse-
(1915). For a summary of cases see 55 CAL. JuR. 2d Workmen's Compensation § 4,
at 16 nn.18, 20 (1960). See also Dominguez v. Pendola, 46 Cal. App. 220, 224,
188 P. 1025, 1026 (1920).
12. CAL. LABOR CODE § 3601 provides: "Where the conditions of compensa-
tion exist, the right to recover such compensation, pursuant to the provisions of this
division is, except as provided in section 3706, the exclusive remedy . . . against the
employer. . . ." See Duprey v. Shane, 39 Cal. 2d 781, 796, 249 P.2d 8, 13 (1952).
13. CAL. LABOR CODE § 3600; 2 B. WrrmKN, supra note 8, at 1662. See also
CAL. LABOR CODE § 3202; 2 HANNA § 8.02[2).
14. CAL. LABOR CODE § 3852, construed in Southern Cal. Gas Co. v. Ventura
Pipe Line Constr. Co., 150 Cal. App. 2d 253, 258, 309 P.2d 849, 852 (1957); Huber
v. Henry J. Kaiser Co., 71 Cal. App. 2d 278, 285, 162 P.2d 693, 696 (1945); Ferrario v.
Conyles, 19 Cal. App. 2d 58, 61, 64 P.2d 975, 976 (1937). In Lamoreux v. San
Diego & Ariz. E. Ry., 48 Cal. 2d 617, 311 P.2d 1 (1957) the court stated: "An
employee is entitled to receive the compensation benefits prescribed by statute without
jeopardizing his right to proceed against a third party tort feasor. The Labor Code
provides that this right of action is not barred by the filing of a claim for compensation,
and... neither the making of an award by the commission nor the payment of the
award by the employer will preclude suit against the third person . . . . [Playment
of the full amount of workmen's compensation is not to be considered as satisfaction
of the third party's tort liability, and the same rule should apply to payment of a com-
promise award." Id. at 625, 311 P.2d at 5-6.
15. De Cruz v. Reid, 69 Cal. 2d 217, 225, 444 P.2d 342, 348, 70 Cal. Rptr.
550, 555 (1968); Baroni v. Rosenberg, 209 Cal. 4, 6, 284 P. 1111, 1113 (1930).
16. CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 3700-03.
17. See Southern Cal. Gas Co. v. Ventura Pipe Line Constr. Co., 150 Cal. App.
2d 253, 258, 309 P.2d 849, 852 (1957).
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quently file against him. 8 In addition, if the employer is free from
fault and the injured employee recovers a judgment against a third party
tortfeasor, the employer has the right to recoup benefits paid to the
injured employee. 9
The employee and employer are given a joint and several cause
of action against an allegedly negligent third party.
20 The employee2'
is entitled to all damages proximately resulting from the injury; the
employer can recover 2 all compensation benefits paid, and any addi-
tional amounts paid in the way of salary, pensions, medical expenses and
the like. 23  The theory behind giving a joint cause of action is that
such an injury to the employee also constitutes an indirect injury
to the employer who must provide the workmen's compensation
benefits . . . . Subrogation is the remedy provided by law to
enable the employer or his insurance carrier, if he has one, to re-
coup his damage at the expense of the negligent third party.
Subrogation . . . . [a]s applied to third party claims . . . is
the independent right of an employer or insurance carrier against
a third party, by whose fault the employee has sustained an in-
dustrial injury, to recover . . . expenditures for compensation.
24
The employer is not restricted solely to bringing action in his own
name;25 he can join as a party plaintiff in a suit previously filed by the
18. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 200 Cal. 579, 583, 253 P.
926, 928 (1927), aff'd, 276 U.S. 467 (1928). Of course if the employer intentionally
injures the employee, the employee may bring a common law action against him.
Carter v. Superior Court, 142 Cal. App. 2d 350, 354, 298 P.2d 598, 600 (1956);
Conway v. Globin, 105 Cal. App. 2d 495, 498, 233 P.2d 612, 614 (1951).
19. CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 3852, 3853, 3856(b).
20. Id. § 3852. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Howard, 80 Cal. App. 2d
728, 182 P.2d 278 (1947); Limited Mut. Comp. Ins. Co. v. Billings, 74 Cal. App. 2d
881, 169 P.2d 673 (1946); State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Matulich, 55 Cal. App. 2d 528,
131 P.2d 21 (1942); 2 HANNA § 23.02[1]. Originally the making of a claim for com-
pensation by the employee operated as a transfer from the employee to the employer of
the right to recover damages against a third party. Cal. Stats. 1913, ch. 176, § 31, at
295. Because a refusal of the employer to join as party plaintiff could easily defeat
the employee's common law right to sue the third party, this rule was somewhat modi-
fied in Stackpole v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 181 Cal. 700, 702-04, 186 P. 354, 354-55
(1919), and Hall v. Southern Pac. Co., 40 Cal. App. 39, 42-43, 180 P. 20, 21 (1919),
by holdings that if the employer refused to join as party plaintiff, under CAL. CODE
CIV. PROC. § 382, the employer could be made a defendant, if the reason thereof was
stated in the complaint.
21. CAL. LABOR CODE § 3850(a) provides: "'Employee' includes the person in-
jured and any other person to whom a claim accrues by reason of the injury or death of
the former."
22. CAL. LABOR CODE § 3850(b) provides: "'Employer' includes insurer as de-
fined in this division." See also CAL. INS. CODE § 11662.
23. CAL. LABOR CODE § 3852.
24. 2 HANNA § 24.01[1], [2]. See also CALIFORNIA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
PRACCE 593 (Cal. Cont. Educ. Bar ed. 1963); Conley & Sayre, Rights of Indemnity
as They Affect Liability Insurance, 13 HASTINOS L.J. 214 (1961).
25. CAL. LABOR CODE § 3852.
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employee,26 or allow the enployee to prosecute the suit independently
and then claim a first lien on the employee's judgment in the amount of
expenditures for compensation.27
The Employer's Negligence and Its Effect Upon
the Recoupment Provisions
Within the workmen's compensation provisions, there is no indi-
cation whether the employer's negligence will defeat his right to recoup
benefits paid to the injured employee. A brief consideration of the
historical background of the rule regarding the employer's negligence
will provide some insight into the problems with which the courts were
faced in trying to reach the most equitable result.
From the concept that the workmen's compensation system was in
no way designed to afford any benefits or immunities to strangers,2
it followed that the negligence of the insured employer would in no
way relieve the negligent third party of his common law liability. In
Pacific Indemnity Co. v. California Electric Works,29 the court stressed
that since there were no provisions in the workmen's compensation
statutes which conditioned the employer's right to recoupment on his
lack of fault or negligence, neither would the court so qualify his
right.
80
Even though section 1717 of the California Civil Code allows the
defense of contributory negligence in all actions, it was held in Milo-
sevich v. Pacific Electric Railway3l to be inapplicable to the workmen's
26. Id. § 3853.
27. Id. § 3856(b). See also id. § 3857. For a discussion of the means by which
an employer may recoup the amounts he has disbursed, see Witt v. Jackson, 57 Cal.
2d 57, 69, 360 P.2d 641, 648, 17 Cal. Rptr. 369, 376 (1961); Burum v. State Comp.
Ins. Fund, 30 Cal. 2d 575, 580-81, 184 P.2d 505, 507 (1947); Benwell v. Dean, 249
Cal. App. 2d 345, 359, 57 Cal. Rptr. 394, 403-04 (1967); Tate v. Superior Court,
213 Cal. App. 2d 238, 246-47, 28 Cal. Rptr. 548, 552-53 (1963); Quisenberry v.
Rulison, 129 Cal. App. 2d 268, 269, 277 P.2d 57, 58 (1954). Under CA.. LABOR
CODE § 3853, if the employee or employer brings an action independently against
the third party, he is required to give notice of the action, and the name of the court in
which the action is brought, by personal service or registered mail. The purpose of the
notice requirement is to enable the employer to decide whether to join in the action and
employ his own attorney, or to permit the employee to proceed alone, and file a claim
for a first lien on the judgment recovered. Quisenberry v. Rulison, 129 Cal. App. 2d
268, 270-71, 277 P.2d 57, 59 (1954). See also Driscoll v. California St. Cable R.R.,
80 Cal. App. 208, 213-14, 250 P. 1062, 1064 (1926); Van Zandt v. Sweet, 56 Cal.
App. 164, 166-67, 204 P. 860, 861 (1922).
28. Sanstad v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 171 Cal. App. 2d 32, 35, 339 P.2d 943,
944 (1959); 2 A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 71.00 (1968) [here-
inafter cited as LARSON).
29. 29 Cal. App. 2d 260, 84 P.2d 313 (1938).
30. Id. at 267-71, 84 P.2d at 318; accord, Finnegan v. Royal Realty Co., 35
Cal. 2d 409, 434-35, 218 P.2d 17, 33 (1950).
31. 68 Cal. App. 662, 230 P. 15 (1924).
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compensation laws. The basis for this reasoning was the statutory
provision that "[ilf the employee joins in, or prosecutes such suit . . .
evidence of the amount of disability indemnity or death benefits paid
by the employer shall not be admissible."32  The court reasoned that
this provision evidenced a legislative intent that the third party action
would be determined without reference to what was paid in benefits to
the injured employee; and, if there could be no reference to such bene-
fits, it would be impossible to determine the amount of damages by
which to reduce the judgment against the third party if the employer
himself were found to be concurrently negligent with the third party
for the employee's injuries. 3
The better reasoned and more prevalent basis for this result was
that prior to 1957, the common law rule barring contribution or indem-
nity between joint tortfeasors still existed. 4 If the third party tort-
feasor's damages were reduced by the amount of workmen's compen-
sation benefits received by the injured workman, there would, in ef-
fect, be contribution from the employer.3 5
In 1957, the California legislature enacted sections 875 to 880 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, commonly referred to as the Joint Tort-
feasors Act, which limited the right of contribution to situations "where
a money judgment has been rendered jointly against two or more de-
fendants in a tort action."3" Because the employee has an exclusive
remedy against the employer for workmen's compensation benefits and
therefore cannot sue the employer in tort and obtain a money judgment
against him, the Joint Tortfeasors Act, which requires a joint money
judgment, has offered the courts no basis for barring recoupment by a
concurrently negligent employer.3 7
Witt v. Jackson
Prohibition of the Negligent Employer's Right of Recoupment
Until 1961, the courts continued to allow a negligent employer to
reimburse himself at the expense of a third party tortfeasor.3 8 In that
year, in the decision of Witt v. Jackson,"9 the supreme court estab-
32. Id. at 668, 230 P. at 17.
33. Id.
34. E.g., Pacific Indem. Co. v. California Elec. Works, 29 Cal. App. 2d 260, 265,
84 P.2d 313, 316 (1938).
35. Cf. id. at 269-70, 84 P.2d at 318-19.
36. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 875(a).
37. Chick v. Superior Court. 209 Cal. App. 2d 201, 203-04, 25 Cal. Rptr. 725,
727 (1962); American Can Co. v. City & County of San Francisco, 202 Cal. App. 2d
520, 523, 21 Cal. Rptr. 33, 34 (1962). See generally 2 LARSON §§ 76.21-.22.
38. 2 LARSON § 75.23.
39. 57 Cal. 2d 57, 366 P.2d 641, 17 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1961), overruling Finnegan
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lished the right of the third party tortfeasor to raise as a defense the
concurrent negligence of the employer to reduce the judgment against
him. An action for damages was brought by two policemen-Witt, the
driver of the automobile, and Grossman, the passenger-for personal
injuries suffered as a result of a rear-end collision. Their employer, the
City of Los Angeles, intervened to recover for damages to its car, and
for workmen's compensation benefits and medical expenses paid to its
injured employees. The defendant raised the issue of Witt's contribu-
tory negligence to defeat the city's right to recover benefits paid to its
employee Grossman. The court held that while the Labor Code did
not state specifically that the employer's right of recoupment was quali-
fied by his freedom from fault, there was nothing to suggest that the
legislature contemplated that the negligent employer could take advan-
tage of the reimbursement provisions.40 It was held that where the
legislature did not provide to the contrary, the provisions of the Labor
Code were modified by Civil Code section 3517, which provides that
"[n]o one can take advantage of his own wrong.
'41
As a result of the Witt decision, when a third party tortfeasor has
pleaded and proved that the negligence of the employer or his agent
has proximately caused the injury suffered by the employee, 42 he is en-
titled to have the judgment against him reduced by the amount of com-
pensation benefits received by the employee.43  The employer does not
benefit from his own wrong by taking advantage of the recoupment
v. Royal Realty Co., 35 Cal. 2d 409, 218 P.2d 17 (1950), and Pacific Indem. Co. v.
California Elec. Works, 29 Cal. App. 2d 260, 84 P.2d 313 (1938).
40. 57 Cal. 2d at 70, 366 P.2d at 649, 17 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
41. 57 Cal. 2d at 72, 366 P.2d at 649, 17 Cal. Rptr. at 377 (1961). See also
50 CALF. L. REV. 571 (1962).
42. Harness v. Pacific Curtainwall Co., 235 Cal. App. 2d 485, 490, 45 Cal. Rptr.
454, 457 (1965); CALIORNIA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION PRACTICE 620, (Cal. Cont.
Educ. Bar ed. 1963). After the Witt decision, the question arose whether the employer
had to be joined by cross-complaint in order to defeat his right to recoupment. In
Sacramento v. Superor Court, 205 Cal. App. 2d 398, 402, 23 Cal. Rptr. 43, 46 (1962),
the court held that whether an action is brought by an employee or employer, the
third party should be able to raise the issue of the concurrent negligence of the em-
ployer to bar the latter's right of recovery. Because the suit is brought for the benefit
of the employer, since he is entitled to recoup benefits paid, the rule applies whether
the employer sues, joins in the employee's suit as party plaintiff, or claims a first lien
on the judgment obtained by the employee. In Vegetable Oil Prod. Co. v. Superior
Court, 213 Cal. App. 2d 252, 256, 28 Cal. Rptr. 555, 558 (1963), it was held that
where the issue of concurrent negligence is properly raised by answer, no cross-com-
plaint is necessary. Since the employee in effect represents the interest of the employer,
in Benwell v. Dean, 249 Cal. App. 2d 345, 361, 57 Cal. Rptr. 394, 405 (1967), the
court held that the employer was properly represented and there was no violation of due
process of the law.
43. Witt v. Jackson, 57 Cal. 2d 57, 73, 366 P.2d 641, 650, 17 Cal. Rptr. 369,
378 (1961).
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provisions, but neither is he required to pay an amount greater than
his limited liability under the workmen's compensation statutes. 44  This
reduction not only prevents the negligent employer from benefiting from
his own wrong, but also prohibits the employee from receiving duplicate
damages for the same injury.
Problems in the Enforcement of the Witt Principles
The supreme court in Witt v. Jackson thus established two prin-
ciples to be applied in third party suits involving an injured employee.
First, a negligent employer can not take advantage of his own wrong
at the expense of the third party tortfeasor.45 Second, the injured em-
ployee can not receive a double recovery for his injuries.4 1 Since this
decision, however, California courts have been continually plagued with
the difficulty of enforcing these principles simultaneously."
One of the primary problems of enforcing the Witt principles arises
from section 3861 of the Labor Code, which empowers the Workmen's
Compensation Appeals Board to credit against the employer's work-
44. CAL. LABOR CODE § 3864 provides: "If an action as provided in this chapter
prosecuted by the employee, the employer, or both jointly against the third person
results in judgment against such third person, or settlement by such third person, the
employer shall have no liability to reimburse or hold such third person harmless on
such judgment or settlement in absence of a written agreement so to do executed prior
to injury." See 2 LARSON § 71.20. While the Witt decision has generally been ac-
cepted as the most equitable method of distributing the burden of the injury between
the faulty parties, 50 CALIF. L. Rav. 571, 575 (1962), there have been experts who
have presented valid and pertinent criticism to the principles espoused in the decision.
Larson indicates that the decision should be restricted to instances in which the
employer is personally negligent. Where a coworker has been negligent and injured
the employee, there is no moral problem of allowing a personally guilty employer to
recover at the third party's expense. And holding the employer liable for the co-
worker's negligence has no proper legal basis, since principles of vicarious liability do
not apply when one negligent employee injures a coemployee, according to the fellow-
servant rule. 2 LARSON § 75.23.
Professor Riesenfeld states that although the allocation scheme adopted by Witt
has been designated as the most equitable, this rests upon the assumption that the
monetary burden of the third party will normally be greater than that of the employer,
even where the extent of the employer's burden is the incurred liability rather than
payments made at the time of litigation. He concludes that the employer will ordi-
narily have a greater share to pay than will the third party, and thus, a system should
be established which "leads to an equitable division of the whole loss, according to the
degree of culpability of the parties." Riesenfeld, Workmen's Compensation and Other
Social Legislation: The Shadow of Stone Tablets, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 207, 216-18 (1965).
45. 57 Cal. 2d at 73, 366 P.2d at 650, 17 Cal. Rptr. at 378; accord, Nelsen v.
Capitol Roof Structures, 34 Cal. Comp. Cases 238, 239-40 (1969).
46. Witt v. Jackson, 57 Cal. 2d 57, 73, 366 P.2d 641, 650, 17 Cal. Rptr. 369,
378 (1961); accord, Nelsen v. Capitol Roof Structures, 34 Cal. Comp. Cases 238,
239-40 (1969).
47. See cases cited notes 54-86 infra.
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men's compensation liability such amounts as the employee obtains by
judgment against the third party. In this regard, it is important to dis-
tinguish the employer's right to obtain a credit against accrued or un-
accrued benefits not yet paid to an injured employee from the em-
ployer's right to a lien for benefits already paid against a judgment ob-
tained by the employee.4" The employer must apply for a lien on the
judgment before the judgment is satisfied;4' if he fails to do so, he is
considered to have waived his right to the first lien." By waiving the
right to the lien, however, the employer cannot be said to have waived
his right to a credit against benefits yet to be paid, since the statute re-
quires the board to allow the credit without reference to the time of
application.51  When the employer brings suit, joins in the employee's
suit, or applies for a first lien, he is seeking to recover benefits pre-
viously paid. 52  However, by applying for a credit against workmen's
48. See Nelsen v. Capitol Roof Structures, 34 Cal. Comp. Cases 238, 239-40
(1969).
49. Jacobsen v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 212 Cal. 440, 448, 299 P. 66, 69 (1931);
Dighton v. Martin, 4 Cal. App. 2d 401, 405-06, 41 P.2d 197, 198 (1935); cf., Lidberg
v. E.T. Leiter & Son, 116 Cal. App. 312, 316, 2 P.2d 526, 528 (1931).
50. Jacobsen v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 212 Cal. 440, 448, 299 P. 66, 69 (1931).
51. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Comma'n, 8 Cal. App. 2d 499,
502-03, 47 P.2d 783, 785 (1935).
52. CAL. LABOR CODE § 3854. Under the workmen's compensation laws, pain
and suffering are not compensable, unless it affects the employee's ability to perform
his duties. Jacobsen v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 212 Cal. 440, 447, 299 P. 66, 68
(1931). Originally it was held that it would be unfair to have the employer attach his
lien to that part of the third party judgment covering pain and suffering, since this
would defeat the employee's right to recover for pain and suffering. Jacobsen v. Indus-
trial Ace. Comm'n, 212 Cal. 440, 449, 299 P. 66, 69 (1931). The burden was upon
the employer to segregate damages and thereby demonstrate which portion of the
third party judgment was lienable. Lidberg v. E.T. Leiter & Son, 116 Cal. App. 312,
315, 2 P.2d 526, 528 (1931); Ansbach v. Department of Indus. Rel., 99 Cal. App. 677,
681, 279 P. 224, 225 (1929). In CAL. LABOR CODE § 3860(b) the entire amount
of the third party judgment was made subject to the employer's lien. After the 1931
amendment, Cal. Stats. 1931, ch. 1119, § 26, at 2370, the court in Dighton v.
Martin, 4 Cal. App. 2d 401, 41 P.2d 197 (1935), refused to hold that the entire
judgment was lienable, and stated that the burden was upon the employee to protect
his common law right by segregating the damages so as to prevent the employer from
attaching his lien to the portion covering pain and suffering. Id. at 405, 41 P.2d at 199.
In Heaton v. Kerlan, 27 Cal. 2d 716, 723, 166 P.2d 857, 861 (1946), and Pacific Gas
& Elec. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Conm'n, 8 Cal. App. 2d 499, 504, 47 P.2d 783, 786
(1935), the entire amount of the judgment was held subject to the lien. Even if the
employee attempts to segregate damages or intends to recover only those elements of
damages which do not duplicate his compensation benefits, the employer will not be
prevented from asserting the lien to which he is entitled under CAL. LABOR CODE §§
3856, 3857. 'This [is because the] action is necessarily, as a matter of law, one
brought on behalf of the employer, if . . . [he] has made payments which can be
recouped under. . . [the Labor Code]." Tate v. Superior Court, 213 Cal. App. 2d 238,
248, 28 Cal. Rptr. 548, 554 (1963). In 1959 CAL. LABOR CODE § 3856 was enacted,
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compensation benefits to be paid, he seeks a set-off against any future
liability he may incur under the workmen's compensation statute, and
against any accrued benefits not already paid. 3
As to the enforcement of the Witt principles, the dilemma pre-
sented by the credit provisions of the Labor Code may be illustrated as
follows: An injured employee files an application for workmen's
compensation benefits and receives $1000 from the compensation car-
rier for temporary disability and medical expenses. He then files a
third party suit against the allegedly negligent tortfeasor for damages
sustained. The employer's carrier applies for a lien on the judgment
recovered; however, in his answer, the third party tortfeasor alleges the
employer's concurrent negligence to defeat the carrier's right to recover
benefits paid. The jury finds negligence on the part of both the third
party and the employer as the proximate cause of the employee's in-
juries. Judgment in favor of the employee is rendered in the amount of
$10,000, which is reduced by $3000 for attorney's fees and costs, and
by $1000 for workmen's compensation benefits received, leaving the
injured employee with a net recovery of $6000. The desired result is
thereby achieved: The employee is prevented from receiving a double
recovery, yet the employer does not benefit from his own wrong at the
expense of the third party.
But suppose the employee, at a later date, goes before the board,
applies for permanent disability, receives a permanent disability rating,
and is awarded what will amount to $15,000 in disability benefits and
pensions. The employer seeks a credit in the amount of $6000, the
net recovery by the employee in his third party suit. If the employer is
given such a credit, he appears to be benefiting from his own wrong.
On the other hand, if the credit is refused, the employee receives a
double recovery for his injuries.
This hypothetical situation demonstrates the dilemma created by
the Witt decision. The cases subsequent to Witt that have had to rule
on an employer's request for a credit have not been helpful in resolving
the problem. However, they do illustrate the difficulties involved in
attempting to satisfy both principles espoused in Witt at the same time.
The Context of the Problem
Three court of appeal decisions subsequent to Witt, while not di-
rectly facing the credit problem, have established the framework within
which the Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board has attempted to
resolve the credit dilemma.54
providing for the deduction of costs and attorney's fees before the employer's lien
could attach.
53. CAL. LABOR CODE § 3861.
54. Slayton v. Wright, 271 A.C.A. 254, 76 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1969); Castro v.
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In these cases the third party filed a cross-complaint against the
employer, and relying on Witt as the basis for his argument, sought a
reduction of any judgment against him equal to workmen's compensation
benefits already paid and to be paid in the future. In Conner v.
Utah Construction and Mining Co.,55 the court answered this contention
by stating that the Witt decision had merely held that where the em-
ployer had been found negligent, the damages should be reduced by
the amount of workmen's compensation benefits already paid to the
employee.56 The court asserted that a reduction in the amount of
benefits that might be recovered in the future was an "unusual and
impractical extension of Witt.' '5 7 In Castro v. Fowler Equipment Co.,5"
the third party defendant argued that there was no method available to
the third party to prevent double recovery on the part of the employee.
The court, avoiding the real problem presented by the defendant, simply
stated that since no permanent disability rating had been made by the
Industrial Accident Commission, it was impossible for the court to de-
termine what the rating might be because the commission had exclusive
jurisdiction to determine the compensation even where a third party ac-
tion was brought before jurisdiction of the commission had been in-
voked. 59
In Slayton v. Wright,60 the third party argued that the employer
was concurrently negligent; and if a reduction in his judgment for fu-
ture compensation benefits payable were not allowed, the employer
would be benefiting from his own wrong, since he would receive a
credit in the amount of the net third party judgment, possibly extin-
guishing any obligation for further compensation.61 In this case, as in
Castro, there had not yet been a permanent disability rating, and since
this question was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Workmen's
Compensation Appeals Board, the court could not itself determine what
the rating would be. But, said the court:
Even though a rating had been made by the . . . Commission
... it does not necessarily follow that the [employee] would
receive all that such award would allow as it may be terminated by
death or other events, and to require that the [employee] should
have his judgment against the tortfeasor reduced [in the sum of
Fowler Equip. Co., 233 Cal. App. 2d 416, 43 Cal. Rptr. 589 (1965); Conner v.
Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 231 Cal. App. 2d 263, 41 Cal. Rptr. 728 (1964).
55. 231 Cal. App. 2d 263, 41 Cal. Rptr. 728 (1964).
56. Id. at 275, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 736.
57. Id.
58. 233 Cal. App. 2d 416, 43 Cal. Rptr. 589 (1965).
59. Id. at 421, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 593 (1965); accord, Slayton v. Wright, 271 A.C.A.
254, 266, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 501 (1969); Sanstad v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 171 Cal.
App. 2d 32, 39, 339 P.2d 943 (1959).
60. 271 A.C.A. 254, 76 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1969).
61. Id. at 265, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 500.
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the permanent disability award] would mean that [the employee]
would not be able to collect on his common law right . . . but
would have to wait for payments on a weekly basis .... 62
The court concluded that while the argument had been advanced
that the plaintiffs recovery should be reduced not only by the amount
that he had already received in compensation benefits, but also by any
amounts that he might receive in the future, this contention had already
been rejected in Conner as constituting an "unusual and impractical
extension of Witt.
'63
In reaching this decision, however, the court expressly declined
to voice any opinion as to whether the negligent employer should be
entitled to a credit if further compensation were awarded. In this re-
gard the court stated:
[T]he parties herein apparently assume that [the employer]
and its insurer . . . will be entitled, ipso facto, to a credit on
[the employee's] disability awards . . . Such an assumption
may, or may not, be valid, and the question will undoubtedly have
to be resolved by the Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board,
which tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the issue. It
would be conjectural to venture a prediction of what the Board's
decision might be in the event a petition for credit is filed by
[the insurer]. While the [employer's] insurer would profit, not-
withstanding the employer's negligence, in the event the credit were
to be allowed, such an order does not appear inevitable.6 4
The court did note that if the employer's credit were to be denied, the
employee would effect a "double recovery" as to future benefits.65
The Conflicting Decisions of the Appeals Board
While the courts have not faced the question of whether the negli-
gent employer should be allowed a credit against future compensation,
the Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board has, in several decisions,
reached contradictory results.
Emphasis on "No Profit From Wrong"
In two cases, the board held that a determination in the third party
action that the employer was negligent would bar his right to a credit.66
62. Id. at 266, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 501; accord, Castro v. Fowler Equip. Co., 233
Cal. App. 2d 416, 421, 43 Cal. Rptr. 589, 593 (1965).
63. Slayton v. Wright, 271 A.C.A. 254, 266, 76 Cal. Rptr. 494, 501 (1969),
quoting Conner v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 231 Cal. App. 2d 263, 275, 41 Cal.
Rptr. 728 (1965).
64. Slayton v. Wright, 271 A.C.A. 254, 267-68, 76 Cal. Rptr. 494, 502 (1969).
65. Id. at 268 n.1, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 502. n.1.
66. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co. v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 31 Cal. Comp. Cases
169 (1966); Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 28 Cal. Comp. Cases
258 (1963).
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In Pacific Automobile Insurance Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Ap-
peals Board,8 7 the board reasoned that since the issue of the employer's
negligence was determined in the third party suit, that determination was
res judicata with respect to his application for a credit. The board
went on to say, by way of dictum, that if the issue of the employer's
negligence had not been determined in the civil suit, the board would
have had jurisdiction to determine the issue for purposes of deciding
whether to grant the credit. 8 The board, however, evaded the issue
of double recovery in this case by stating that there was no double
recovery because the "judgment in the civil action merely represented
damages for pain and suffering and for loss of wages beyond the
amount of temporary disability paid, and did not include compensation
for permanent disability.
69
The measure of damages in a common law tort action, however,
would normally encompass "an estimate of the plaintiff's entire future
loss of earning capacity." 70 Thus, by denying a credit to the employer
the board would, under usual circumstances, be allowing a double re-
covery to the employee, despite its statements to the contrary. By
holding that the employer's right to a credit was barred by a finding of
negligence in a prior third party action, the board thereby preserved
the Witt principle prohibiting a negligent employer's recovery at the
expense of the principle prohibiting double recovery by the injured work-
man.
Emphasis on "No Double Recovery"
The contradiction in the board's position came in 1969 in the case
of Nelsen v. Capitol Roof Structures.71 There, an employee injured in
an industrial accident had received workmen's compensation benefits
67. 31 Cal. Comp. Cases 169 (1966).
68. In a later decision, Pearce v. Blackwell & Sunde, 33 Cal. Comp. Cases 243
(1968), the issue was specifically raised whether the board had jurisdiction to find
negligence on the part of the employer and to allow a credit on the basis of that finding.
It was held in that case that where there had been no specific court finding or stipulation
regarding the employer's negligence in a third party suit, then the issue of negligence
had no bearing on the employer's right to a credit.
69. 31 Cal. Comp. Cases at 171 (1966).
70. Nelsen v. Capitol Roof Structures, 34 Cal. Comp. Cases 238, 241 (1969).
"Plaintiff may also recover the anticipated loss of his future earning through
continued impairment of his working capacity after the time of trial. In determining
the length of time over which he might have been expected to earn, his life expectancy
at the time of the injury becomes important. It is everywhere agreed that for this
purpose mortality tables. . are admissible in evidence. They afford a rough guide, by
a process of multiplying the estimated annual loss of earnings by the number of years
that plaintiff might have been expected to live." W. PRossER & Y. SMrM, CAsES AND
MATERuLs ON TORTS 598 (4th ed. 1967).
71. 34 Cal. Comp. Cases 238 (1969).
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and then instituted suit against the third party tortfeasor. The issue of
the employer's negligence was submitted to the jury and they returned an
affirmative finding; the judgment was accordingly reduced by the
amount of benefits paid to the date of trial. Thereafter, the injured
employee sought additional compensation benefits and the carrier re-
quested a credit against any future benefits awarded in the amount of
the employee's net recovery in the third party suit. The credit was
disallowed by the referee because the employer had been found to be
negligent. 72 The case was appealed on the ground that it was error to
refuse to allow the credit, since such refusal resulted in a double recovery
to the employee. 7  The board upheld the petitioner's contention and
allowed the carrier credit against future benefits to be paid.74
No permanent disability rating had been made in the Nelsen case
at the time of the third party judgment. Thus, benefits paid to the in-
jured workman up to the time of suit did not include permanent disabil-
ity; consequently, such benefits were not included in the reduction of
the third party judgment.75 The board correctly concluded that the
third party judgment included permanent loss of future wages, so that if
the employee were granted permanent disability after the third party
suit, with no reduction in the award for the recovery received from the
third party, he would be receiving double recovery for permanent dis-
ability.
Since future workmen's compensation benefits, unadjudicated by
the Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board, cannot lawfully reduce
the judgment against the third party,7 6 the only way that double recov-
ery can be barred is through a credit to the employer in the amount of
the net recovery against the third party. And, as the board stressed in
the Nelsen case, the Witt decision specifically stated that double re-
covery should not be permitted even where the employer's negligence
is a proximate cause of the injury.
By this line of reasoning, the board appears to have applied the
double recovery principle of Witt at the expense of the negligent em-
ployer principle. Nevertheless, the board felt that its decision com-
plied with both of the principles announced in Witt.7s The board held
that while Witt established that a negligent employer could not profit
from his own wrongdoing by recouping benefits against the third
party tortfeasor, this principle did not apply where the employer was
72. Id. at 239.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 243.
75. Id. at 240-41.
76. Id. at 240.
77. Id. at 241.
78. Id. at 241-42.
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seeking a credit against future compensation payments. 79
When seeking recoupment. . . the employer is obviously seeking
affirmative relief, and in a real sense the employer. . . is a party
plaintiff . . . In such a direct attempt to recover workmen's
compensation benefits paid . . . it is eminently reasonable that
the employer should . . . be . . . accountable for his own con-
tributory negligence.
When asserting his right to a credit, on the other hand, the
employer is attempting to off-set his further liability to the extent
that the employee has already received monies from the third
party tortfeasor. There is no direct attempt to recover money
from the employee himself, but merely an attempt to assert a
credit ....
In this situation, the employer is not profiting from his own
wrong by asserting his right to a credit . . . . Assuming the
employer has been found negligent and has been denied his right
to recoupment . . . the employer has already been denied a
right of recovery which but for his wrong-doing he would have
been entitled to . . . . [T]he employer has not somehow es-
caped his obligation to pay compensation . . . . [He has paid
for his wrong. The question is, must he pay even more to the
extent of duplicating relief which the employee has already re-
ceived in the form of his net third party recovery? The question
must be answered in the negative.80
From an analysis of these decisions, there appear to be two lines
of cases attempting to harmonize, unsuccessfully it seems, the principles
set forth in Witt. The first is concerned primarily with enforcement
of the tenet that the negligent employer should not benefit from his
own negligence."' In so prohibiting the employer's receipt of a credit
against future compensation benefits, the cases allow the injured em-
ployee to receive double recovery. Nelsen, however, demonstrated the
obvious fallacy in barring the credit.8 2  The earlier the injured em-
ployee brings an action against the negligent third party, the less his
benefits under workmen's compensation will be; the smaller his benefits,
the less his third party judgment will be reduced. Not only does he
have his common law judgment, but he may still continue to receive
disability under his original award or even apply for permanent dis-
ability. Under the theory of this first line of cases, since the employer
is concurrently negligent, he gets no credit for the amount of the net
third party judgment and is therefore liable for the entire amount of
any future workmen's compensation award. The earlier the third party
suit is filed, the greater the double recovery by the employee.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 242.
81. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co. v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 31 Cal. Comp. Cases
169 (1966); Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 28 Cal. Comp. Cases 258
(1963).
82. 34 Cal. Comp. Cases at 242-43.
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The second line of reasoning places greater emphasis on assuring
that the injured employee receives no such double recovery.8 This
approach, illustrated by Nelsen, prevents double recovery by giving the
negligent employer a credit, equal to the net third party judgment,
against future compensation benefits. In effect, however, the employer
is allowed to benefit by his own wrong.
There seems to be no justification for distinguishing, as Nelsen
does, between recoupment of benefits already paid, which is allowed
only if the employer is free from fault, and credit for future benefits,
which is allowed even if the employer is concurrently negligent with
the third party. 84 The general effect of each is the same-reduction of
the employer's total liability under the workmen's compensation laws.85
Moreover, although on its facts Witt was limited to the question of re-
coupment of benefits already paid, the reasoning applies equally to a
situation where an employer requests a credit against future liability.
The supreme court stated in Witt that there was nothing in the Labor
Code that suggested an intent to allow the negligent employer to take
advantage of the reimbursement remedies.86 By the same token, there
is nothing in the Labor Code that suggests an intent to allow him to
take advantage of the credit remedies either. Therefore, in the ab-
sence of express terms to the contrary, the credit provisions must also
be deemed qualified by section 3517 of the Civil Code, which provides
that "no one can take advantage of his own wrong."
To say that the relief given by the credit provisions is not profit-
able merely because it is not affirmative relief seems to overlook eco-
nomic realities and to ignore the nature of the workmen's compensation
system. Any release of capital that was previously committed to com-
pensation of the injured employee is financially beneficial to the em-
ployer or his carrier. Under the workmen's compensation system,
upon the occurrence of an industrial injury arising out of and in the
course of the employment, statutory liability is imposed upon the em-
ployer for all damages that are a legitimate consequence of the injury;
any relief from that liability must be sought through proper legal chan-
nels: either recoupment, through a direct action against the negligent
third party or by a lien on the employee's judgment against the third
party; or credit, through filing a claim with the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Appeals Board. Both methods of relief should logically be subject
to the same qualification of freedom from fault, since both result in a
reduction of the overall liability imposed under the workmen's com-
83. Nelsen v. Capitol Roof Structures, 34 Cal. Comp. Cases 238 (1969).
84. Id. at 241-42.
85. 6 S. CAL. L. REV. 258, 259 (1933).




As the cases discussed above demonstrate, no satisfactory solu-
tion has as yet been presented for the simultaneous enforcement of both
Witt principles when the employer's right to a credit is involved. In
order to remedy such a situation, major changes in the workmen's
compensation laws are necessary.
Solutions to the Dilemma
Overrule Witt v. Jackson
The first possible solution would be to provide by statute that the
employer's negligence in no way bars his right to recoup amounts paid
as compensation benefits to the injured employee, thereby nullifying the
Witt decision. In fact, the majority of jurisdictions hold that the em-
ployer's contributory negligence is irrelevant because (1) his cause of
action against the third person is derivative, and the employer's negli-
gence would not be a defense against the employee; and (2) the work-
men's compensation act did not expressly preclude his recovery if he
was concurrently negligent.
8 7
An argument often relied upon in support of this solution is based
on the fact that in a great many cases where the employer is found to be
concurrently negligent, it is actually the negligence of a fellow employee,
which has contributed to the injury of the employee, for which the em-
ployer is held responsible. Because the employer is not personally
negligent, allowing him to recover under such circumstances should
create no moral indignation."" Furthermore, since at common law the
fellow servant rule precludes holding the employer vicariously liable for
the negligent act of one employee which injures another employee, it
is legally inaccurate to hold the employer responsible for the negligence
of the coemployee in an action against the third party.89
This solution, of course, would deprive the injured employee of a
double recovery for his injures, but would fail to deal with the "odd
spectacle . . . [of] a negligent employer reimbursing himself at the
expense of a third party."8 0  In addition, while the purpose of the
workmen's compensation system is to impose liability without fault, it
does not necessarily follow that when an employer is at fault, he i' in
any way to be relieved of that liability. Where the employer is not at
fault in causing the injury, the workmen's compensation statutes ex-
pressly provide that he may recover any expense or liability under the
workmen's compensation laws as a consequence of the acts of the
87. Id. at 70-71, 366 P.2d at 649, 17 Cal. Rptr. at 377; see 2 LARsON § 75.23.
88. 2 LARsoN § 75.23.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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negligent third party.91 However, where the employer is himself negli-
gent, there appears no sound basis for placing the entire burden of
damages upon the negligent third party, when in fact he and the
employer are concurrent or joint tortfeasors. In this situation, the third
party has caused the employee no damages to which the employer has
not contributed. This solution, therefore, allows the negligent employer
to benefit from his own wrong at the expense of the third party, simply
to prevent a double recovery to the employee. One principle of Witt
is preserved at the expense of the other.
Double Recovery as an Amount from a Collateral Source
The second possible means of reconciling the conflicting Witt prin-
ciples is to treat the double recovery of the injured employee as an
amount received from a collateral source. This theory has been
stated succinctly as follows:
Where a person suffers personal injury or property damage
by reason of the wrongful act of another, an action against the
wrongdoer. . . is not precluded nor is the amount of the damages
reduced by the receipt by him of payment for his loss from a
source wholly independent of the wrongdoer.
92
In De Cruz v. Reid, 3 at the time the injured employee brought an
action against the negligent third party, he and his employer, with the
consent of the Industrial Accident Commission, had entered into an
agreement of compromise and release whereby the employer waived his
right to subrogation94 as part of the consideration. In the third party
suit, the defendant attempted without success to introduce evidence of
the $18,000 received from the settlement. He contended that even if
the employer were nonnegligent, his waiver of the right to reimburse-
ment must inure to the benefit of the third party tortfeasor, rather than
to the employee. The court, however, held that since the defendant
had introduced no evidence bearing on the concurrent negligence of the
employer, he did not bring himself within the Witt holding requiring a
reduction in judgment. In reaching this result, the court stressed that
compensation benefits for which reimbursement is waived by a non-
negligent employer inure to the benefit of the employee as payments
received by him from a collateral source and do not constitute an im-
permissible double recovery.95
91. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
92. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Starley, 28 Cal. 2d 347, 349, 170 P.2d 448, 450
(1946).
93. 69 Cal. 2d 217, 444 P.2d 342, 70 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1968).
94. See generally CALIFORNIA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION PRACTICE 593 (Cal.
Cont. Educ. Bar ed. 1963).
95. 69 Cal. 2d at 226-27, 444 P.2d at 348, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 556; accord, Quast v.
Operated Equip. Co., 265 A.C.A. 863, 866 (1968).
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This reasoning fails to recognize that the rule against double recov-
ery is aimed at preventing unjust enrichment, regardless of the sources
from which recovery is received.98 Plaintiff will not be allowed to take
advantage of fortuitous circumstances which make more than one per-
son legally responsible for his injuries.97  This proposition was argued
by Chief Justice Traynor in his dissenting opinion in the case of An-
heuser-Busch, Inc. v. Starley:98
"When te plaintiff has accepted satisfaction in full for the
injury done him, from whatever source it may come, he is so far
affected in equity and good conscience, that the law will not permit
him to recover again for the same damages." Whether the per-
sons . . . responsible . . have acted jointly or separately is im-
material, for the controlling questions are whether the loss for
which they are responsible is identical and whether the payment
by one. . . has fully compensated the plaintiff.99
It is especially difficult to apply the collateral source rule where
the employer would be denied recoupment on the grounds that he is a
concurrent tortfeasor, since the collateral source rule does not apply to
concurrent tortfeasors. 10 0 Because the negligence of the employer was
not pleaded and proved in the De Cruz case,101 the employer was not, in
effect, a concurrent tortfeasor. Consequently, application of the col-
lateral source rule in that case was not the same as an application of the
rule where the employer has been found to be concurrently negligent in
causing the injury. In conclusion, this solution also satisfies one prin-
ciple of Witt at the expense of another. It prevents the employer from
benefiting from his own wrong by inaccurately applying the term col-
lateral source to the double recovery received by the injured employee.
It should be noted that the foregoing solutions do not actually
reconcile the principles of Witt. What they do is nullify one principle
to dispose of the problem.
Reduction of Third Party Judgment by Estimated Future Benefits
A third proposal would entitle the third party tortfeasor to plead
and prove the negligence of the employer and then have the judgment
against him reduced by the amount of benefits paid and to be paid in
the future. The third party would be required to produce expert testi-
mony predicting the employee's permanent disability rating, if any, on
96. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Starley, 28 Cal. 2d 347, 353, 170 P.2d 448, 452
(1946) (Traynor, J., dissenting).
97. Id.; PROSSER 266-68.
98. 28 Cal. 2d 347, 170 P.2d 448 (1946).
99. Id. at 352, 170 P.2d at 451 (citations omitted).
100. See PRossER 266-68. See generally Riesenfeld, Workmen's Compensation
and Other Social Legislation: The Shadow of Stone Tablets, 53 CA11F. L. REV.
207, 216-18 (1965).
101. 69 Cal. 2d 217, 444 P.2d 342, 70 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1968).
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which his future benefits would be based. This predicted rating would
not be binding on the Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board in any
future proceeding to determine actual permanent disability. Moreover,
jurisdiction to make the award would still remain with the board. This
proposal has the advantage of defeating double recovery by the in-
jured employee, while also preventing the employer from taking ad-
vantage of his own wrong. In the Castro case,1"2 of course, the
court said that it would not determine what the rating might be, since
the commission has exclusive jurisdiction to determine compensation. 103
The court apparently assumed that the determination of the amount of
estimated future benefits by which the third party judgment was to be
reduced would be the final determination, for purposes of a workmen's
compensation award, of the employee's permanent disability rating. 04
It failed to see the possibility of using expert testimony merely to predict
the rating in order to aid the jury in establishing the amount of damages
to which the injured employee was entitled.
Although this solution reconciles the Witt principles, in doing so it
may result in somewhat of a windfall to the negligent third party, be-
cause the employer is required, without regard to the amount of the
third party judgment, to pay the entire amount of workmen's compensa-
tion benefits. Where the third party judgment and the workmen's
compensation award are relatively equal, the employer will assume
almost the entire burden of damages, while the negligent third party will
benefit by the fortuitous circumstance that the man he injured was
covered by workmen's compensation. The result of this solution would
be an inequitable system for distribution of the damages resulting from
an industrial injury.
Proration of Damages
The last alternative proposed is believed by this author to present
the most viable and equitable means of distributing the damages be-
tween the third party tortfeasor and the negligent employer, while pre-
venting the injured workman from receiving double recovery for his
injuries. This approach, as will be demonstrated, makes it possible to
remain within the context of the Witt decision without opening an
avenue through which the third party can escape liability.
The basis for the distribution, under this system, would be a pro-
ration of damages according to the respective liabilities of the two
negligent parties. In effect, a modified form of contribution would be
allowed, with the employer's liability limited to that imposed by the
102. 233 Cal. App. 2d 416, 43 Cal. Rptr. 589 (1965).
103. Id. at 421, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 593.
104. See id.
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workmen's compensation laws, and the third party's limited to the judg-
ment obtained against him. Proration as a means of adjusting un-
equal liabilities is not new to the law. For example, proration is con-
sidered the logical and equitable solution to the problem of allocating
ultimate responsibility for losses insured by more than one carrier,
where the policies have different applicable limits.1°5 The relation
of this principle to the Witt situation is best illustrated by an example.
An injured workman has applied for and received $1000 in tem-
porary disability. He brings suit against the negligent third party and
obtains a judgment of $40,000. To reduce his liability, the third party
pleads and proves the concurrent negligence of the employer, thereby
reducing the amount payable to $39,000. After deducting attorney's
fees and costs of $9000, the injured workman has received a net judg-
ment of $30,000. He then applies for a permanent disability rating
and is granted an award that will amount to $14,000 during his life-
time. The employer will be entitled to a credit against his liability in
the amount of the net third party judgment; consequently, his liability
is reduced by $30,000, and he will not be responsible for payment of
benefits up to that point.
The third party will have a right of action against the employer to
recoup the amount which he has expended in payment of the employer's
pro rata share of the damages. This action will have to be filed within
a reasonable amount of time after the final disability award is made.
The amount to which the third party is entitled is figured as fol-
lows: The third party has a judgment against him for $40,000; the
employer is liable for $15,000, $1000 for temporary and $14,000 for
permanent disability. The employee is entitled to recover the larger of
the two liabilities. To prorate the damages, the two liabilities are
totalled, and the share of each is determined. The third party's portion
is $40,000/$55,000 or 8/11 of the $40,000 judgment, making him
liable for $29,090. The employer's share is $15,000/$55,000 or 3/11
of $40,000, resulting in liability of $10,909. The third party has paid
$39,000 in satisfaction of his judgment, and may recover the amount
by which the sum he has paid exceeds his pro rata share, in this in-
stance $9910. Since the employer has paid $1000 in temporary dis-
ability, he will pay in toto $10,909, $1000 directly to the employee,
$9910 to the third party.
Because the larger of the awards is prorated according to re-
spective liabilities, neither party will ever be required to pay the full
amount against him. Therefore, even where the workmen's compensa-
105. E.g., Meritplan Ins. Co. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 247 Cal. App. 2d
451, 55 Cal. Rptr. 561 (1966); Colby v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 220 Cal. App. 2d 38,
46-48, 33 Cal. Rptr. 538, 543-44 (1963).
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tion award is larger than the third party judgment, if the third party has
satisfied the judgment, he will be entitled to recoupment from the em-
ployer.
The action by the third party against the employer merely deter-
mines the rights between the two negligent parties, and in no way pre-
vents the injured employee from later obtaining an additional award of
workmen's compensation benefits. The employer will have the balance
of the credit, secured upon the employee's original request for per-
manent disability, to apply against any additional award made. The
$30,000 credit was applied to the original award, leaving a balance of
$16,000 on the record. If an additional award of $23,000 is made, the
employer will apply the $16,000 balance to the award, leaving him with
a $7000 liability. The employee receives a total of $38,000, $1000
temporary disability from the employer, $30,000 net third party judg-
ment, and $7000 in additional workmen's compensation benefits. 106
This proposal reconciles the principles of Witt, preserves the pur-
poses of the workmen's compensation system, and prevents the negli-
gent third party from escaping his common law liability at the expense
of the insured employer. The negligent employer is required to pay a
pro rata share of the damages, with limitations set by the applicable
workmen's compensation laws. He in no way benefits from his own
wrong. The injured employee retains his right to receive workmen's
compensation benefits and his right to bring a suit in tort against the
negligent third party; but he is prevented from receiving a double re-
covery for the same injury. And the negligent third party tortfeasor
pays his pro rata share of the damages by satisfying the judgment against
him and then bringing an action against the employer to recoup the
amount paid in his behalf.
Ronni Jackl*
106. The total amount paid by the employer and the third party tortfeasor will be
$47,000, but since $9000 was allocated to costs and attorney's fees, the employee will
net only $38,000.
* Member, Second Year Class.
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